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ABSTRACT 
Aristotle says that we are responsible (αἴτιοι) for our voluntary actions and character. 
But there’s a question about whether he thinks we are morally responsible and, if so, what he 
thinks makes it such that we are. Interpretations of Aristotle on this question range from 
libertarian, according to which Aristotle considers us morally responsible in part because we 
have undetermined choices, to deflationary, according to which Aristotle has no theory of 
moral responsibility. Despite putative evidence to the contrary, neither interpretation captures 
Aristotle’s view on the matter, and their rejection paves the way for a compatibilist proposal, 
one that works both as an interpretation of Aristotle and as an independently attractive view. I 
detail this view and defend it against one prominent objection. 
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1 Introduction and Preliminary Remarks 
Aristotle says that we are responsible (αἴτιοι) for our voluntary actions and character.1 But 
there’s a question about whether he thinks we are morally responsible and, if so, what he 
thinks makes it such that we are. Some say that Aristotle thinks we are morally responsible, and 
that he thinks we are so in part because we have undetermined choices. This is the libertarian 
interpretation. Still others argue that Aristotle cannot be said to have a theory of moral 
responsibility at all, since his purpose in articulating the conditions of voluntariness is merely to 
pick out actions that are subject to change through strictly forward-looking praise and blame. 
This is the deflationary interpretation. Despite putative evidence to the contrary, neither 
interpretation captures Aristotle’s view, and their rejection paves the way for a compatibilist 
proposal, one that works both as an interpretation of Aristotle and as an independently 
attractive view.  
I begin by responding to the libertarian interpretation, which I divide into two defenses, one 
having to do with Aristotle’s conception of voluntary action, and the other with his argument 
for responsibility for character in EN 3.5. Both defenses involve leeway and source 
incompatibilist assumptions that I take it as my task in sections 2 and 3 of this paper to show 
that Aristotle himself neither endorses nor assumes when articulating and defending his 
conception of the voluntariness of action and character. In this way, I will have shown that, 
appearances aside, Aristotle is not a libertarian.  
After having rejected the libertarian interpretation, in section 4 I turn to the deflationary 
interpretation. I argue that this interpretation cannot be sustained in light of Aristotle’s 
                                                          
1
 De An. = De Anima, De Int. = De Interpretatione, EE = Eudemian Ethics, EN = Nicomachean Ethics, Meta. = 
Metaphysics, Pol. = Politics, Rhet. = Rhetoric. Translations of Aristotle are mine.  
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conception of moral desert (one’s being worthy of, τὸ ἄξιος εἷναι, something in virtue of past 
actions) and the place of indignation (νέμεσις), anger (ὀργή), and vengeance (τιμωρία) in the 
overall good life and city.  
In section 5, I detail the compatibilist view that emerges from these considerations and 
defend it against one prominent objection.  
Before I begin, however, five remarks about terminology will be necessary. First, I take 
moral responsibility for action to involve a relationship between the agent and her action such 
that, when it obtains, it is in principle appropriate to respond to the agent with praise, blame, or 
other related actions or attitudes, setting aside any prospective reason for doing so.2 For 
example, a person is morally responsible for some bad action (e.g., tripping a pedestrian), just 
in case it’s in principle appropriate to blame him, even if you (as another pedestrian tripper) 
shouldn’t do so and doing so wouldn’t, say, enhance public safety, contribute to his 
rehabilitation, or aid in particular or general deterrence.3  
Second, I understand libertarianism to be the view that moral responsibility is incompatible 
with causal determinism, and that we are, generally, morally responsible. Thus, because the 
falsity of causal determinism functions as one of the libertarian’s constraints on moral 
responsibility, a comprehensive defense of libertarianism must target causal determinism.  
Third, I understand compatibilism as the view that there’s one possible world at which 
causal determinism is true and there is at least one person who’s morally responsible for 
                                                          
2
 To be clear, when certain prudential or propriety conditions don’t obtain within a particular context, such 
responses might still be in principle though not in fact appropriate, as when blame would be hypocritical (e.g., 
Rhet. 2.6 1384b19). This notion of moral responsibility coincides with the basic-desert sense of moral responsibility 
used by Pereboom 2001, p. xx.  
3
 Although consequentialist moral responsibility theorists will likely reject this conception (e.g., Schlick 1939, ch. 7), 
it permits me to sidestep mere semantic squabbles with deflationary interpreters like Jean Roberts in her (1989).  
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something.4 A compatibilist, then, neither requires the falsity of causal determinism for moral 
responsibility, nor is burdened with the task of proving the truth of causal determinism. Unlike 
the libertarian, it is open to her to be agnostic about the truth or falsity of this thesis, while still 
maintaining her belief in moral responsibility.  
Fourth, by causal determinism (henceforth determinism) I mean the thesis that every non-
quantum-level event, including human choices and actions, is uniquely and sufficiently brought 
about by antecedent causes (I call these antecedent causes determining conditions). In this way, 
my conception differs importantly from others at work in the literature, including Sarah 
Broadie’s, who defines it as the “absolute claim that everything is necessary or necessitated,”5 
and Richard Sorabji’s, who defines it as “the view that whatever happens has all along been 
necessary, that is, inevitable or fixed.”6 These regrettably make determinism indistinguishable 
from fatalism, so that given Aristotle’s emphatic rejection of fatalism in De Int. 9 it’s 
unsurprising that both Broadie and Sorabji consider Aristotle an indeterminist. But uncovering 
Aristotle’s position with respect to determinism and situating him within today’s free will 
debate require that we define determinism in a way that’s mindful of this difference. I do this.   
Finally, to describe a choice or action as undetermined is simply to say that it lacks 
determining conditions. 
2     Aristotle on Voluntary Action and Why the Libertarian Reading of It Fails 
The libertarian interpretation of Aristotle rests on two defenses, one having to do with 
Aristotle’s characterization of the voluntariness of action and the other with his argument for 
                                                          
4
 I borrow this definition from Mele 2013. 
5
 Broadie 1991, p. 158. 
6
 Sorabji 1980, p. ix. 
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responsibility for character. The purpose of this section will be to respond to the first of these 
two defenses, which can be summarized in the following Undetermined Action Argument: 
1. On Aristotle’s view, if we are morally responsible for φ-ing, then φ-ing is voluntary. 
2. Aristotle believes that φ-ing is voluntary only if (i) the source of φ-ing is (in) us or (ii) 
φ-ing is “up to us” to do or not do.  
3. If Aristotle accepts (i), then he rejects determinism.  
4. If Aristotle accepts (ii), then he rejects determinism. 
5. Therefore, on Aristotle’s view, if we are morally responsible for φ-ing, then 
determinism is false. 
6. Aristotle thinks that we are morally responsible for φ-ing. 
7. Therefore, Aristotle is a libertarian. 
 
Driving Premises 3 and 4 of this argument are source and leeway incompatibilist assumptions, 
respectively; whereas Premise 3 is supported by the source incompatibilist assumption that 
determinism undermines our being the source of our actions, Premise 4 is supported by the 
leeway incompatibilist assumption that determinism undermines possession of alternatives. If 
Aristotle is shown to share these assumptions, whether implicitly or explicitly, then it’s clear 
that he is committed to the rejection of determinism. In this section, I will show that these 
premises are false, beginning with Premise 3, since there’s no reason to think that Aristotle 
shares these assumptions.  
2.1     Aristotle on the voluntary agent’s unique causal status  
Aristotle defines voluntary action as action for which “the origin is in [the agent], when he 
knows the particular circumstances in which the action takes place” (ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ εἰδότι τὰ 
καθ’ ἑκαστα ἐν οἷς ἡ πρᾶξις).7 Aristotle’s characterization of the source of our voluntary actions 
here is by no means an isolated phenomenon: throughout both EE and EN, Aristotle repeatedly 
                                                          
7
 EN 3.1 1111a23-34. 
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says that voluntary actions have their origin in the agent,8 or are ones whose origin is the 
agent.9 Thus, the question naturally arises as to whether Aristotle, in describing the origin of 
our voluntary actions in this way, rejects determinism. Indeed, Aristotle says not only that the 
origin of our voluntary actions is in us, but that such actions can be traced back to no other 
source than what’s in us.10 But the truth of determinism, it would seem, renders our actions 
such that they do not have their source in us, but rather in sufficient, antecedent causes 
outside of us. It would seem, then, that Aristotle is committed to the rejection of determinism 
when he identifies the agent as occupying this unique causal status in relation to her voluntary 
actions. If so, then Premise 3 of the Undetermined Action Argument goes through. 
To show that Aristotle isn’t committed to the rejection of determinism, at least not for this 
reason, I raise three considerations.  
First, there are plenty of places in which Aristotle describes an origin as itself being but one 
link in a longer causal chain. In EN 6.1, for example, Aristotle describes deliberation and desire 
as the origin of choice; and choice as the origin of deliberate action; and deliberate action as 
the origin of events.11 So although initially we might be tempted to think of an origin as 
something that operates outside of any preceding causal sequence, Aristotle himself doesn’t 
conceive of something’s origin as coming to be or existing in this way. 
Second, although there are places in which Aristotle characterizes the agent, not only as an 
origin, but the origin of her voluntary actions, there’s no reason to think that this has 
indeterminist implications for Aristotle’s view. Aristotle makes similar claims elsewhere, for 
                                                          
8
 EE 2.8 1224b15; EN 3.1 1110a15-17, 1110b4, 1111a23, 3.5 1113b20-21. 
9
 EE 2.6 1222b15-20, 1222b28-9, 1223a15; EN 3.3 1112b28-32, 3.5 1113b17-21, 6.2 1139a31-b5.  
10
 EN 3.5 1113b19-21. 
11
 EN 6.1 1139a32-33; 1139a31, b5. I borrow this example from Sorabji 1980, p. 228.  
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example, in Meta. 6, where he tells us that the coincidental (συμβεβηκός) has no cause 
(αἴτια),12 and that a series of events might have a coincidental origin, itself uncaused.13 But the 
context of Aristotle’s remarks here makes it clear that they’re neutral between a determinist 
and indeterminist metaphysics.   
Aristotle’s aim in Meta. 6 is to account for why the coincidental fails to be a proper object of 
scientific enquiry, and his answer is that the coincidental has no cause (αἴτια). But we need to 
bear in mind that the word Aristotle uses, αἴτια, is ambiguous between two meanings: cause 
(as we typically understand the term) and explanation. Given that Aristotle prioritizes the latter 
notion in his usage, we should understand him to be saying, not that the coincidental lacks a 
cause, but that its occurrence lacks an explanation within the Aristotelian scientific 
framework.14 On Aristotle’s view, science seeks to explain various phenomena in the world by 
appeal to the necessities (i.e., natures) or regularities at work therein. It’s for this reason that 
Aristotle thinks that the coincidental cannot be an object of scientific inquiry, since neither is it 
necessary (i.e., by nature) nor does it correspond to a regular pattern in nature. As examples of 
coincidences, Aristotle offers a baker’s baking something healthy, a snow storm in the dog days, 
and a man’s being white. What these occurrences have in common and what makes them 
coincidences in the first place is that their coming to be cannot be explained by appeal to the 
natures of the things in question (e.g., to the baker’s being a baker, a man’s being a man) or to 
patterns of regularity (e.g., to its being the dog days). But here notice that, to deny that these 
things have an explanation isn’t to also deny that they have a cause; surely, the cause of the 
                                                          
12
 ὥστ’ ἐπεὶ οὐ πάντα ἐστὶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ ἀεὶ ἢ ὄντα ἢ γιγνόμενα, ἀλλὰ τὰ πλεῖστα ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, ἀνάγκη εἶναι 
τὸ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ὄν (Meta. 6.2 1027a8-11). 
13
 δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι μέχρι τινὸς βαδίζει ἀρχῆς, αὕτη δ’ οὐκέτι εἰς ἄλλο. ἔσται οὖν ἡ τοῦ ὁπότερ’ ἔτυχεν αὕτη, καὶ 
αἴτιον τῆς γενέσεως αὐτῆς ἄλλο οὐθέν (Meta. 6.3 1027b12-14). 
14
 See Frede 1980, pp. 223-224.  
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healthiness of the baker’s concoction is ultimately something he did, though qua baker he 
cannot be picked out as cause, at least when cause means explanation, and this in turn involves 
appeal to necessities and regularities in nature.  
Aristotle’s claims about the unique causal status of voluntary agents should be situated in 
the same framework. When Aristotle tells us that we are the sole origin of our voluntary 
actions, what he’s doing here is providing what he takes to be the best explanation for our 
actions, which involves appeal to the agent’s “being the agent”15—for example, the agent’s 
deliberating about what to do through consideration of what he takes to be his reasons, his 
making a choice on the basis of those reasons, his acting on the basis of that choice, and so on. 
We don’t point to the wallet on the street as being what explains your picking it up and rifling 
through it; we point instead to the relevant features of your agency to explain your action. On 
Aristotle’s view, the various circumstances in which we find ourselves, and the things we 
encounter therein, do not explain our actions better than features of our agency. And when 
they do—as when a person finds herself in circumstances “which overstrains human nature and 
nobody would withstand 16 (ἂ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν ὑπερτείνει καὶ μηδεὶς ἂν ὑπομείναι)—
Aristotle unsurprisingly claims that the circumstances are the origin, and not the agent.17  
These considerations are borne out more fully in my third and final point, based on 
Aristotle’s most sustained discussion of voluntary action, provided in EN 3.1 where the concept 
of voluntariness is first introduced. It’s here that we can see that he’s interested in a more 
                                                          
15
 O’Keefe 1997, p. 257.  
16
 EN 3.1 1110a25-26. 
17
 Of course, showing that Aristotle is interested in making room for attributions of responsibility to agents of a 
distinctly moral kind by appeal to their unique explanatory role in relation to their voluntary actions requires that 
more be said about the significance of this role and what it involves. I return to this question in section 5. 
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metaphysically modest thesis that the source incompatibilist would attribute to him, which can 
be put as follows:  
Metaphysically Modest Source Thesis (MMST): the origin of φ-ing is (in) an agent A if 
and only if φ-ing is caused by some feature of A’s agency (e.g., appetitive desire, choice, 
deliberation, etc.).18  
 
That MMST is what Aristotle intends by his claims about the source of voluntary action is 
suggested by his responses to two separate inquiries. The first inquiry is whether an action 
performed under coercive circumstances is voluntary, as when, for example, a captain jettisons 
cargo in order to keep his ship afloat. Aristotle’s answer is “yes”: this action is chosen (αἱρεταί) 
by the agent, which Aristotle treats as sufficient for it to have originated in the agent, who 
chose to act as he did given his knowledge of the circumstances.19 In the second inquiry, 
Aristotle takes up the question as to whether actions done for the sake of noble or pleasant 
objects are forced (βίᾳ), where an action is forced just in case its origin is outside the agent, the 
agent contributing nothing. Developing the same line of reasoning, Aristotle this time answers 
“no”: he observes that pleasure attends these actions, an observation that bears on the inquiry 
since it indicates that the agents acting for the sake of such things act from their desires. This 
feature of the causal history of their actions is subsequently treated as sufficient to show that 
the actions in question originated in the agents and are therefore not forced.20  
Now if MMST accurately captures Aristotle’s conception of what it is to be the source of 
one’s voluntary actions, then on the basis of these remarks alone Aristotle isn’t committed to 
the rejection of determinism, and Premise 3 is false. For to have our actions caused by various 
                                                          
18
 See Meyer (2011) and Roberts (1989). 
19
 EN 3.1 1110a11-16. Aristotle doesn’t say, though it can be assumed, that the agents in question have the 
requisite knowledge.  
20
 EN 3.1 1110b12-13. 
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features of our agency is compatible with the presence of antecedent causes that sufficiently 
and uniquely bring it about that we deploy these features as we do. And yet, the falsity of 
Premise 3 is not enough to reject the Undetermined Action Argument, which can do without it, 
so long as Premise 4 holds. It’s to this premise that I now turn.  
2.2     Voluntary action and the ability to do otherwise  
Aristotle repeatedly describes voluntary actions as being those that are “up to us” (ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν) 
to do or not do,21  perhaps nowhere more forcefully than at the outset of EN 3.5, where he 
writes: 
But the workings of the virtues are concerned with these things [i.e., choice, 
deliberation, and wish]. Therefore virtue is up to us. And similarly also vice; for when 
acting is up to us, not acting is too, and where ‘no’ is up to us, ‘yes’ is too; in this way, if 
acting, which is noble, is up to us, not acting, which is shameful, is also up to us, and if 
not acting, which is noble, is up to us, acting, which is shameful, is also up to us. And if 
doing noble and shameful actions is up to us, and similarly not doing them, and this was 
being good or bad, then being good or bad is up to us.22 
  
αἱ δὲ τῶν ἀρετῶν ἐνέργειαι περὶ ταῦτα· ἐφ’ ἡμῖν δὴ καὶ ἡ ἀρετή. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ κακία· 
ἐν οἷς γὰρ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν τὸ πράττειν, καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν, καὶ ἐν οἷς τὸ μή, καὶ τὸ ναί· ὥστ’ εἰ 
τὸ πράττειν καλὸν ὂν ἐφ’ ἡμῖν ἐστί, καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν ἐφ’ ἡμῖν ἔσται αἰσχρὸν ὄν, καὶ εἰ 
τὸ μὴ πράττειν καλὸν ὂν ἐφ’ ἡμῖν, καὶ τὸ πράττειν αἰσχρὸν ὂν ἐφ’ ἡμῖν. εἰ δ’ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν τὰ 
καλὰ πράττειν καὶ τὰ αἰσχρά, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν, τοῦτο δ’ ἦν τὸ ἀγαθοῖς καὶ 
κακοῖς εἶναι, ἐφ’ ἡμῖν ἄρα τὸ ἐπιεικέσι καὶ φαύλοις εἶναι. 
 
Before saying just what Aristotle is saying in this passage, let’s start with what he’s not: at least 
here, Aristotle is not saying that being good or bad, or having a virtuous or vicious character, is 
up to us. This conclusion would follow only on the supposition that being good or bad is just a 
matter of acting nobly or basely. But Aristotle is unambiguously clear that acting nobly or basely 
is neither necessary nor sufficient for one’s being good or bad. It’s not necessary because one 
                                                          
21
 EE 2.6 1223a8, 2.8 1225a9-10, 2.10 1226a28, 1226b30-31; EN 3.1 1110a17-18, 3.5 1115a2-3, 6.12 1144a9-10. 
22
 EN 3.5 1113b5-14.  
10 
 
could be virtuous (and presumably also vicious) while asleep or inactive;23 and it’s not 
sufficient, since one can perform good or bad actions without also being good or bad, since the 
former merely requires various agential abilities that one without a developed character can 
still possess.  
Aristotle’s remarks, then, are restricted to the performance of good or bad actions, and 
what they seem to amount to is this: if φ-ing is “up to us,” then not φ-ing is too. In other words, 
when we have the ability to φ, we also have the ability to do otherwise than φ.  
Imagine that you are deliberating about whether to catch up on a new novel or to begin 
grading the stack of exams that has been cluttering your desk for the past week or so. To read 
the novel would be, you realize, rather selfish; after all, your students have been anxiously 
awaiting their graded exams. You read that novel anyway. The implication of Aristotle’s claim 
seems to be that, if what you did was “up to you,” then you could have done otherwise, you 
could have done the right thing instead.  
But here too, the question naturally arises as to whether Aristotle’s claims about what’s “up 
to us” commit him to rejecting determinism. There are, after all, broadly two ways of 
conceiving of this ability to do otherwise, one whose possession requires indeterminism, and 
the other that doesn’t.24  
Strong ability: an agent has the strong ability to do otherwise at time t just in case he 
could have done otherwise at t, given the same determining conditions. 
 
Weak ability: an agent has the weak ability to do otherwise at time t just in case he 
would have done otherwise at t, given slightly different determining conditions. 
 
                                                          
23
 EN 1.5 1095b31-33. 
24
 Lewis 1981, helpfully discussed in Vihvelin 2013, pp. 162-164.  
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The weak ability to do otherwise is compatible with determinism, whereas the strong ability is 
not. Consider this: at time t, I raised my hand to vote ‘yes.’ If determinism is true, then I lacked 
the strong ability to do otherwise than raise my hand at t, since what I did was uniquely and 
sufficiently brought about by antecedent causes. But it doesn’t always follow from the truth of 
determinism that I lacked the weak ability to do otherwise at t. To figure out whether I had this 
ability, we would have to consider what I’d do under slightly different determining conditions. 
What determining conditions count as “slightly different” will depend on one’s metric of 
closeness to the actual world. Such metrics are used to determine what counterfactuals can be 
stipulated in a possible world, such that what happens in that possible world can be used to 
uncover facts about agential abilities in the actual world. In other words, these metrics are used 
to determine which possible worlds count as nearby possible worlds, where only what happens 
in nearby possible worlds is revelatory of agential abilities in the actual world. For the purposes 
of this paper, I don’t want to commit myself to the details of any one closeness metric, and in 
order to elucidate this weak ability I will use uncontroversial changes in the “external” world at 
the time of action. So returning to the example, to see if I had the weak ability to do otherwise, 
we might consider what I’d do if voting ‘yes’ required that I refrain from raising my hand at t. If I 
were to refrain under these slightly different determining conditions, then I had the ability to 
do otherwise than raise my hand at t. However, if no determining conditions could be specified 
such that they both (i) satisfy the closeness metric and (ii) are such that under them I’d do 
otherwise at t, then I lacked the ability to do so at t. Let’s say, for instance, that I suffer from an 
acute hand-raising compulsion. Presumably, as an intrinsic property of mine, this compulsion is 
relevant to any assessment of my abilities and therefore has to be included among any set of 
12 
 
determining conditions that also satisfy the closeness metric. But if possession of this 
compulsion is included, then I’d lack the weak ability to do otherwise, since there’d be no set of 
determining conditions that both satisfy the closeness metric and are such that under them I’d 
do otherwise than raise my hand at t.  
The truth of Premise 4 thus rests on whether Aristotle’s locution concerning what’s “up to 
us” implicates the strong ability to do otherwise. It will be my contention in the remainder of 
this section that when Aristotle attributes to agents the ability to do otherwise, he is best read 
as attributing to them the weak ability. If I’m right, then Premise 4 also fails, and the 
Undetermined Action Argument with it. 
My argument will proceed in three stages. First, I will show that Aristotle’s claims about 
certain mixed actions (μικταὶ πράξεις) and about the virtuous agent entail his endorsement of 
the following thesis:  
Sufficiency for Action Thesis (SAT): the possession of certain agential features, together 
with background conditions, is sufficient to bring about an agent’s φ-ing, even though 
φ-ing was “up to him” to do or not do. 
 
Second, I will argue that understanding Aristotle as intending to attribute to agents a strong 
ability to do otherwise when he claims that some action is “up to them” to do or not do would 
thereby render SAT incoherent. Third, I will show that, if Aristotle is read as intending just to 
attribute to agents the weak ability, the coherence of SAT remains intact. From this, I conclude 
that, because we ought to avoid attributing to Aristotle an incoherent position when a plausible 
alternative is available, we should take Aristotle’s claims to be implicating the weak ability, and 
not the strong one.  
13 
 
 Aristotle’s endorsement of SAT is revealed, first, by his remarks about the captain who 
orders that cargo be jettisoned during a violent storm.25 On the one hand, Aristotle says that he 
acted voluntarily and that his action was “up to him” (ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ). At the same time, he also 
writes: “for without [such circumstances] nobody voluntarily throws out cargo, but all sensible 
people [would] for the purpose of the salvation of oneself and the crew”26 (ἁπλῶς μὲν γὰρ 
οὐδεὶς ἀποβάλλεται ἑκών, ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ δ’ αὑτοῦ καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἅπαντες οἱ νοῦν ἔχοντες). This 
last remark suggests that, on Aristotle’s view, a person’s agential features (in this case, her 
good sense), together with background conditions (in this case, a life-threatening storm and 
heavy cargo), are sufficient to bring about the agent’s action.  
Aristotle’s endorsement of SAT is also suggested by his remarks about the ideally virtuous 
agent. On Aristotle’s view, the virtuous agent possesses a certain kind of psychic perfection, in 
which the nonrational part of his soul waits on, and is perfectly obedient to, the rational part’s 
orders.27 The virtuous person (unlike the incontinent person) never acts against his choice 
(προαίρεσις), since his feelings are in perfect harmony with his evaluative judgments about 
what’s good; and he (unlike the continent person) is never motivated by shameful desires.28 For 
these reasons, Aristotle also claims that “the good man will never voluntarily perform bad 
actions”29 (ἑκὼν δὲ ὁ έπιεικὴς οὐδέποτε πράξει τὰ φαῦλα). But here again, this characterization 
of the virtuous agent suggests that such a person’s agential features (in this case, her practical 
reason and character states), together with background conditions, are sufficient to bring about 
what she does (at least, that is, in circumstances in which there’s only one noble thing to be 
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 EN 1110a6-9. 
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 EN 3.1 1110a9-11. 
27
 For Aristotle’s use of the master-servant analogy, see for example EN 7.6 1149a26-29. 
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 EN 7.8-9.  
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 EN 4.9 1128b28-29. 
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done). And yet there’s no reason to think that such a person’s actions aren’t voluntary and so 
“up to her” to do or not do.  
The problem here with attributing SAT to Aristotle, while at the same time taking him to 
attribute to agents the strong ability to do otherwise, is this: on the one hand, the first part of 
SAT states that an agent A’s φ-ing is sufficiently caused prior to its occurrence. At the same 
time, the second part of SAT, if read as attributing the strong ability to do otherwise than φ to 
A, would state that A’s φ-ing is not sufficiently caused. In this way, SAT is rendered incoherent.  
But while taking Aristotle to attribute the strong ability to do otherwise to agents would 
render Aristotle’s view incoherent, taking him to attribute the weak ability to them does not. 
One can claim that agent A’s φ-ing was sufficiently caused prior to its occurrence while still 
ascribing to A the weak ability to do otherwise than φ, since having the weak ability to do 
otherwise than φ is compatible with being sufficiently caused to φ. The sensible captain, for 
example, had the weak ability to do otherwise than dump the goods during the storm if, on a 
pleasant day, she wouldn’t have.  
These considerations strongly suggest that the agential ability implicated in Aristotle’s 
discussion of what’s “up to us” is in the end metaphysically modest. And yet, as evidence that 
the preceding discussion fails to capture all that Aristotle has to say about the voluntariness of 
action, some libertarian interpreters appeal to Aristotle’s argument for responsibility for 
character; they offer that Aristotle, in establishing the voluntariness of our character states, 
presents an additional necessary condition on the voluntariness of action. In the next section, I 
conclude my consideration of the libertarian interpretation by showing that this and another 
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libertarian reading of Aristotle’s argument are not in the end motivated by the passage in 
question.  
3    The Voluntariness of Character and Why Libertarian Reading Here Fares No Better 
Before detailing and responding to the two libertarian readings of Aristotle’s argument for 
responsibility for character, it will be useful to look at the passage, spanning EN 3.5 1114a1-22, 
used to support these readings. Here, Aristotle writes:   
(i) They [i.e., lawmakers and private citizens] even punish the ones who are ignorant of 
something in the laws, which they should know and is not difficult. And similarly also in 
other cases, where people seem ignorant because of carelessness, since not being 
ignorant is up to them; for they are in control of taking care. (ii) But perhaps one is the 
sort not to take care. (iii) But they are themselves responsible for becoming people of 
this sort, by living carelessly and being unjust or intemperate; some by acting viciously, 
and others by whiling their time in drinking bouts or the like. For the particular activities 
make them of such a sort. And this is clear from the ones who practice for a contest or 
deed; for they continue practicing. Therefore, being ignorant that states arise from 
particular activities—this belongs to the utterly senseless. And if somebody knowingly 
performs actions from which he will become unjust, he will be unjust voluntarily. 
Further, it is unreasonable to suppose that the one committing injustice does not wish 
to be unjust, or that the one acting intemperately does not wish to be intemperate. This 
indeed is not to suppose that if ever one wishes he will cease from being unjust and be 
just; for neither will the sick person become healthy in this way. And if in this way he 
happened to become sick, then he is sick voluntarily, through living incontinently and 
disobeying his doctors. So it was then open to him not to be sick, but not any longer, 
after he has let himself go, just as the one who throws a stone is not still able to take it 
back. Yet taking the stone and throwing it were up to him; for the origin was in him. And 
in this way also to the unjust and the intemperate it was open at the beginning not to 
become such people, so they are such people voluntarily; but having become so, it is no 
longer possible for them not to be.  
 
(i) καὶ τοὺς ἀγνοοῦντάς τι τῶν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις, ἃ δεῖ ἐπίστασθαι καὶ μὴ χαλεπά ἐστι, 
κολάζουσιν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὅσα δι’ ἀμέλειαν ἀγνοεῖν δοκοῦσιν, ὡς ἐπ’ 
αὐτοῖς ὂν τὸ μὴ ἀγνοεῖν· τοῦ γὰρ ἐπιμεληθῆναι κύριοι. (ii) ἀλλ’ ἴσως τοιοῦτός ἐστιν 
ὥστε μὴ ἐπιμεληθῆναι. (iii) ἀλλὰ τοῦ τοιούτους γενέσθαι αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι, ζῶντες 
ἀνειμένως, καὶ τοῦ ἀδίκους ἢ ἀκολάστους εἶναι, οἱ μὲν κακουργοῦντες, οἱ δὲ ἐν πότοις 
καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις διάγοντες· αἱ γὰρ περὶ ἕκαστα ἐνέργειαι τοιούτους ποιοῦσιν. τοῦτο 
δὲ δῆλον ἐκ τῶν μελετώντων πρὸς ἡντινοῦν ἀγωνίαν ἢ πρᾶξιν· διατελοῦσι γὰρ 
ἐνεργοῦντες. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ ἐνεργεῖν περὶ ἕκαστα αἱ ἕξεις γίνονται, 
κομιδῇ ἀναισθήτου· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀγνοῶν τις πράττει ἐξ ὧν ἔσται ἄδικος, ἑκὼν ἄδικος ἂν 
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εἴη. ἔτι δ’ ἄλογον τὸν ἀδικοῦντα μὴ βούλεσθαι ἄδικον εἶναι ἢ τὸν ἀκολασταίνοντα 
ἀκόλαστον· οὐ μὴν ἐάν γε βούληται, ἄδικος ὢν παύσεται καὶ ἔσται δίκαιος· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ 
νοσῶν ὑγιής, καί<τοι>, εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχεν, ἑκὼν νοσεῖ ἀκρατῶς βιοτεύων καὶ ἀπειθῶν τοῖς 
ἰατροῖς. τότε μὲν οὖν ἐξῆν αὐτῷ μὴ νοσεῖν, προεμένῳ δ’ οὐκέτι, ὥσπερ οὐδ’ ἀφέντι 
λίθον ἔτ’ αὐτὸν δυνατὸν ἀναλαβεῖν· ἀλλ’ ὅμως ἐπ’ αὐτῷ τὸ λαβεῖν καὶ ῥῖψαι· ἡ γὰρ 
ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τῷ ἀδίκῳ καὶ τῷ ἀκολάστῳ ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν ἐξῆν τοιούτοις μὴ 
γενέσθαι, διὸ ἑκόντες εἰσίν· γενομένοις δ’οὐκέτι ἔξεστι μὴ εἶναι. 
 
The passage follows a certain dialectical progression, where an objection appearing at (ii) 
challenges a claim Aristotle makes at (i), and this objection in turn motivates Aristotle’s 
argument for responsibility for character, starting at (iii).30  
The objection challenges specifically Aristotle’s claim that the careless person is in control of 
the cause of his ignorance (EN 3.5 1114a2-3), which Aristotle earlier identifies as his disposition 
to be careless (EN 3.5 1114a1-2). Just before the objection is raised, Aristotle is arguing that 
somebody who’s ignorant due to drunkenness is in control of the cause of his ignorance, “for 
he is in control of not getting drunk, and this [i.e., being drunk] is the cause of his ignorance” 
(κύριος γὰρ τοῦ μὴ μεθυσθῆναι, τοῦτο δ’ αἴτιον τῆς ἀγνοίας). He next argues that those whose 
ignorance is due to carelessness are also in control of the cause of their ignorance.31 The 
objection challenges this analogy. For while ignorance due to drunkenness is caused by a choice 
of the agent (e.g., to get drunk, or to drink too much, etc.), ignorance due to having a 
disposition toward carelessness involves making no such choice. Say, for example, that you’re 
ignorant of your students’ concerns about their exams. This ignorance needn’t be caused by a 
choice of yours, say, not to ask them how they feel, but might instead be a consequence of your 
development of a disposition toward carelessness when it comes to other people and their 
cares. Indeed, it might be this disposition that leads to your failure to even ask how they feel 
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 My reconstruction of the objection and understanding of its context are indebted to Meyer 2011, pp. 136-137. 
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 EN 3.5 1113b30-1114a3. 
17 
 
about their performance on the exam. It is on the grounds of this disanalogy that the objector 
challenges Aristotle’s claim that the careless person is in control of the cause of her ignorance.   
The argument implicit in the objection (which I’ll call the No Control Argument) can be put 
as follows: 
1. The agent has a disposition to be careless (EN 3.5 1114a3-4). 
2. Once an agent has acquired a disposition, he isn’t in control of having that 
disposition. 
3. Therefore, the agent isn’t in control of having the disposition to be careless. 
 
A further implication attached to the objection is the following: 
 
4. If an agent isn’t in control of the cause of an outcome, then that outcome isn’t in his 
control or voluntary.  
5. Therefore, outcomes caused by our dispositions aren’t in our control or voluntary.  
 
By outcome, I mean especially to include states of being, like drunkenness or ignorance, though 
it is not unwarranted to also include actions.  
It’s at this point that Aristotle responds with what I’ll call his Responsibility for Character 
Argument. While conceding the objector’s conclusion at Premise 3, Aristotle nevertheless 
argues: 
1. If we were once in control of acquiring our dispositions, then we have them 
voluntarily.  
2. We were once in control of acquiring our dispositions.  
3. Therefore, we have them voluntarily.  
 
The implications of Aristotle’s argument, which target directly Premise 4 of the No Control 
Argument, can be drawn out as follows: 
4. If we have our dispositions voluntarily, then outcomes flowing from our dispositions 
are in our control and voluntary. 
5. Therefore, outcomes flowing from our dispositions are in our control and voluntary.  
 
18 
 
Notice that in my rendering of the dialectic I have been careful not to expressly insert any 
metaphysical assumptions or implications. I take it as the task of the libertarian interpreter to 
show that Aristotle is in the end assuming an indeterminist metaphysics, or making claims that 
require its truth. Before considering what I take to be the strongest argument to think that he 
is, it is worth pausing at the outset to consider one libertarian reading of this passage that 
clearly fails.  
3.1     Aristotle, ultimate responsibility, and SFAs 
The interpretation, offered by free will theorist Robert Kane, takes Aristotle’s argument for 
responsibility for character to be operating on the following assumption:  
If a man is responsible for wicked acts that flow from his character, he must at some 
time in the past have been responsible for forming the wicked character from which 
these acts flow.32  
 
It is for this reason that Kane understands this passage to be suggestive of his own view, 
according to which responsibility for action requires ultimate responsibility, where an agent has 
such responsibility over an action just in case he is “responsible for anything that is a sufficient 
reason (condition, cause, or motive) for the action’s occurring.”33  
Let’s say that your selfish choice to read the novel rather than grade exams “issues from, 
and is sufficiently explained by, your character and motives (together with background 
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 Presumably, Kane means to say that one is ultimately responsible for his action just in case he is responsible for 
anything that is, together with the relevant background conditions (e.g., the particulars of the situation), a 
sufficient cause of the action. Although Kane makes this qualification in the next passage I have quoted, strangely 
he doesn’t do so when first stipulating the condition for ultimate responsibility. But without this further 
qualification, his condition of ultimate responsibility doesn’t seem to make sense. Here’s an example: we’ve just 
finished a race and are exhausted. As it happens, we are the last ones to finish and the hospitality tent has already 
been plundered; there’s only one remaining bottle of water. I swoop in and grab the spoils, greedily guzzling the 
cool water. On the one hand, my selfish character explains my action; but while I might be responsible for forming 
such a character, my character is not, on its own, sufficient for my action. After all, lots of other features of the 
situation had to be in place (e.g., there had to be a bottle of water left, etc.). 
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conditions).” According to Kane, if you’re morally responsible for your selfish choice, then you 
“must be at least in part responsible by virtue of choices or actions voluntarily performed in the 
past for having the character and motives” you have now.34 And, on Kane’s view, such choices 
or actions must be undetermined, where a choice or action is undetermined just in case there is 
nothing that sufficiently causes the choice or action prior to its occurrence. Kane refers to these 
choices or actions as “self-forming actions,” or SFAs, and summarizes his discussion in this way: 
“Thus, I believe, with Aristotle, that responsibility for our wills (characters, motives, and 
purposes) accumulates over time. It is by making many SFAs through a lifetime that we 
gradually form and reform our characters, motives, and purposes in ways not determined by 
our past.”35 
Of course, if Kane’s reading of the passage is correct, then it is clear that Aristotle is a 
libertarian of sorts. But this reading isn’t correct.  
First, even if Aristotle is interested in establishing the voluntariness of actions caused by our 
character, as Kane takes him to be, all that can be supported from this passage is the more 
restricted claim that 
The voluntariness of one’s character states is sufficient for the voluntariness of actions 
flowing from such states.   
 
On the basis of this passage alone, we cannot conclude that Aristotle thinks that the 
voluntariness of our character states is necessary for the voluntariness of action’s flowing from 
these states. To be clear, Aristotle certainly thinks that we are responsible for our character; 
this fact is evidenced throughout EE and EN. So what is at issue here is not whether Aristotle 
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thinks we are responsible for our character, but rather how such responsibility is supposed to 
relate to the voluntariness of action. My claim is that Kane makes a necessity claim when only a 
sufficiency claim is licensed by the text. What’s more, it would be strange for Aristotle to tack 
another constraint onto voluntary action at the very end of Book 3 of his Nicomachean Ethics, 
after already going on at length at the very beginning of it about two conditions offered there 
as independently necessary and jointly sufficient.  
Second, and more to the point, even if Aristotle is making the stronger necessity claim, 
reason would still have to be given as to why we ought to take Aristotle’s claims about the 
voluntariness of our character states to have the indeterminist implications Kane sees in them. 
After all, Aristotle might be concerned about historical considerations having to do with the 
production of certain agential features, like our character states, without also being concerned 
about determinism itself.  
There is but one consideration that suggests that Aristotle’s claims rest on the falsity of 
determinism. I conclude my case against the libertarian interpretation by considering this. 
3.2     Aristotle’s asymmetrical claims about control 
In his closing remarks, Aristotle concedes to the objector that we are no longer in control of 
our character, writing: 
And in this way also to the unjust and the intemperate it was open at the beginning not 
to become such people, so they are such people voluntarily; but having become so, it is 
no longer possible for them not to be.  
 
οὕτω δὲ καὶ τῷ ἀδίκῳ καὶ τῷ ἀκολάστῳ ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν ἐξῆν τοιούτοις μὴ γενέσθαι, διὸ 
ἑκόντες εἰσίν· γενομένοις δ’οὐκέτι ἔξεστι μὴ εἶναι. 
 
As his reason for why we are no longer in control of our character, Aristotle cites that not 
having the character we now have is no longer possible for us. At the same time, Aristotle’s 
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Responsibility for Character Argument is premised on our once having such control—in other 
words, on its once being possible for us to have a different character than we now do. These 
remarks naturally raise the question as to what accounts for this change in the level of control 
we have over our character states, from the time when we were first acquiring them to when 
they are fully-developed.  
One answer to this question is that Aristotle thinks that a person’s having a fully-developed 
character state at time t is causally sufficient for her possession of that state at any time after t, 
and that more generally it is the presence of such a cause that undermines possession of 
alternatives. But if, on Aristotle’s view, it is simply the presence of a sufficient antecedent cause 
for some outcome (e.g., agent A’s being vicious) that makes it such that A cannot bring it about 
that she isn’t vicious, then Aristotle is committed to the rejection of determinism, since he 
thinks that there’s a time when it’s open to not be vicious. Moreover, if these considerations 
are correct, then they might be taken to cast serious doubt on my argument, developed in 
section 2, that Aristotle’s attribution to voluntary agents of the ability to do otherwise 
implicates a weak, and not strong, ability.  
So without an alternative explanation for Aristotle’s claims about our control, the libertarian 
reading takes priority as the only way to make sense of Aristotle’s remarks. Is there an 
alternative explanation supported by Aristotle’s texts? I think that there is.  
Consider again that you’re faced with the choice between grading exams and reading the 
novel, and that in the end you choose to read the novel. Now also imagine that over the years, 
when confronted with similar such choices, you’ve repeatedly opted for the selfish alternative, 
causing you eventually to acquire a deep-seated, thoroughly vicious character, and that your 
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vicious character is responsible for your choice. While Aristotle would say that your choice to 
read the novel is “up to you” to do or not do, he’d still say that it’s no longer possible for you 
not to be vicious, although it once was.  
I submit that we can make sense of the discrepancy between the kind of control Aristotle 
takes us to have over our voluntary actions, on the one hand, and the kind of control he takes 
us to have over our character states, on the other, in a way that is metaphysically neutral. 
Specifically, we can do this through consideration of the significant difference between acting 
in some way (reading the novel), and being in some way (vicious). First, notice that very little 
would have to change with respect to the determining conditions presently at work in your case 
in order to get you to grade the exams. We could now stipulate, for example, that failure to 
grade the exams would cause you to get seriously jammed up by horrendous end-of-semester 
student evaluations. Considering your behavior in this nearby possible world would allow us to 
conclude that, although you chose to read the novel, you could have chosen differently. 
At the same time, however, notice that a great deal would have to change in order for you 
to not be vicious (again, presuming that you are thoroughly vicious, as Aristotle does when he 
claims that the vicious cannot cease any longer being vicious). So much would have to change 
about you that to say that it’s presently in your control to not be vicious would be false, since 
any such radical change to your agential features would fail any plausible metric of closeness to 
the actual world. But, prior to your acquiring such character states, no such difficulties arise: 
you’ve yet to acquire such distinguishing, thoroughly deep-seated agential features.  
Thus Aristotle’s asymmetrical attributions of control or lack thereof in relation to our 
voluntary actions and character, respectively, need not have metaphysical implications of any 
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kind. Instead, this asymmetry could be premised on the obvious difficulty raised by having to 
specify determining conditions that result in substantial changes to the agent but which still 
satisfy our metric of closeness to the actual world. In providing this alternative, metaphysically 
neutral explanation for the discrepancy between Aristotle’s control claims, and failing to see 
any other reason why Aristotle should be committed to indeterminism on the basis of this 
passage, I take myself to be done with the libertarian defense of Aristotle on the voluntariness 
of our character states. And since I have already provided sufficient evidence against the 
libertarian reading of Aristotle on the voluntariness of action, my treatment of the libertarian 
interpretation is at its end.  
4     The Deflationary Interpretation and Response 
But that Aristotle doesn’t have a libertarian theory of moral responsibility does not mean 
that he has a compatibilist one. He might not have a theory of moral responsibility at all. This is 
what Jean Roberts thinks. While agreeing with the account of voluntariness I’ve so far sketched, 
Roberts rejects any connection between this account and moral responsibility, offering instead 
a deflationary interpretation of the purpose behind Aristotle’s turn to voluntariness. On 
Roberts’ deflationary interpretation, Aristotle’s purpose in articulating his conditions for 
voluntariness is merely to pick out those actions that can be reinforced or discouraged, 
depending on their desirability, through praise and blame. Practices of praise and blame are 
themselves justified solely on consequentialist grounds, and so too is one’s desert; as Roberts 
claims: “One ‘deserves’ punishment, for Aristotle, if there is something wrong with one’s soul of 
the sort that might be correctable.”36  
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4.1     Robert’s three-part defense 
Roberts provides three distinct reasons in support of her interpretation. First, she notes 
Aristotle’s concern to show that children and animals also act voluntarily. Therefore, if 
voluntary action is perfectly coextensive with morally responsible action, then children and 
animals not only act voluntarily but are morally responsible for what they do. Roberts believes 
that this conclusion should make us rethink whether voluntariness is intended to track moral 
responsibility for action, saying: “I take it that whatever precisely moral responsibility is, 
animals and small children do not have it.”37 
Second, while one might try to forgo this difficulty by drawing a distinction within the 
category of voluntary agents, Roberts blocks this by arguing that there’s no feature common to 
average adults that could sufficiently and relevantly distinguish them from children or 
animals.38 Although one might respond by appealing to adults’ possession of reason, Roberts 
argues that on Aristotle’s view reason cannot sufficiently and relevantly distinguish adults from 
children. She writes: 
Aristotle does not, in discussing responsibility for action, go out of his way to distinguish 
adults from children because he thinks that many adults are very much like children. It is 
part of being good that appetite obey reason and that reason reason well. Those who 
act badly almost always have reason which has been perverted by appetite and are to 
that extent as much creatures of irrational desire as children.39 
 
That the possession of reason fails to sufficiently and relevantly distinguish adults from children 
on Aristotle’s view is further suggested, Roberts thinks, by Aristotle’s failure to distinguish 
between the sorts of pedagogical and corrective measures appropriate to each. If reason 
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played an important role in controlling and motivating adults’ actions, then he’d emphasize the 
use of rational persuasion or argument. But he doesn’t, even explicitly rejecting it while 
emphasizing instead the role of fear and penalties in controlling the behavior of the majority.40  
Finally, Roberts claims that, in view of Aristotle’s theory of moral development and moral 
psychology, Aristotle cannot have a theory of moral responsibility. Aristotle thinks that the 
formation of good habits in youth makes “all of the difference” for how one turns out.41 From 
this, Roberts argues that when Aristotle claims that an agent is responsible for having the 
character that he has, his claim cannot be an answer to the question of “what determines, or 
has determined, any individual’s character?” This is because, as Roberts puts it, “if the question 
here is ‘what ultimately caused x to be of this character?’ Aristotle ought to say, if he is to be 
consistent, that other people had at least a great deal to do with it.”42 Thus, it is doubtful that 
this is the question Aristotle is attempting to provide an answer to, and so it is doubtful that 
Aristotle’s discussion is really about moral responsibility for character.43 Moreover, because on 
Aristotle’s view character determines how the good appears, and the agent always pursues the 
apparent good, the agent also cannot be said to be morally responsible for his voluntary 
actions, either.  
4.2     Response 
I’ll now respond to each of these points in turn, ultimately arguing that the deflationary 
interpretation is both unsupported by, and irreconcilable with, Aristotle’s texts.  
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To begin, Roberts is correct that voluntary action cannot be perfectly coextensive with 
morally responsible action. But she’s wrong to draw the further inferences that Aristotle isn’t 
interested in moral responsibility and that voluntariness has nothing to do with it. Aristotle’s 
texts don’t warrant these inferences, and there’s more reason to think the opposite; namely, 
that Aristotle is interested in attributing moral, as opposed to strictly causal, responsibility to 
agents.   
Recall that moral responsibility involves a relationship between the agent and her action 
such that, when it obtains, it is in principle appropriate to respond to the agent with praise, 
blame, or other related actions or attitudes, even if there are no prospective reasons for doing 
so. We can now see that Aristotle accepts moral responsibility, and that he even has reason to 
defend it, by considering what he says about moral desert, as well as his conception of the 
place of indignation, anger, and vengeance in the overall good life and city.   
Although Aristotle tells us that indignation (νέμεσις) isn’t a virtue, since it’s without choice 
(ἄνευ προαιρέσεως) and is an emotion,44 he nevertheless characterizes it as praiseworthy, 
since it is a mean state between two vicious ones (envy and malice) and contributes to just 
action.45 Whereas envy involves feeling pain when one’s neighbors are deservedly prosperous, 
malice involves joy at undeserved adversities; neither envy nor malice is ever praiseworthy 
because they’re always unfitting for their objects.46 Indignation, on the other hand, is always 
praiseworthy since it’s always fitting for its object: it involves feeling pain at undeserved, and 
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pleasure at deserved, good or bad fortune.47 Its manifestation is a sign of good character, 
because indignation truthfully tracks something about the people toward whom it’s felt; 
namely, whether or not they deserve48 the good or bad fortune that attends them. What’s 
especially important is that Aristotle implicates a conception of distinctly moral desert, in which 
one’s desert is tied to the moral quality of one’s past actions.49 He writes:  
For instance, parricides and assassins, whenever they meet vengeance, no good man 
would be grieved. For one should rejoice at such people [i.e., the bad men], and in this 
way also at those who fare well, in accordance with their desert; for both are just, and 
make the good man rejoice.50   
 
οἷον τοὺς πατραλοίας καὶ μιαιφόνους, ὅταν τύχωσι τιμωρίας, οὐδεὶς ἂν λυπηθείη 
χρηστός· δεῖ γὰρ χαίρειν ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, ὡς δ’ αὕτως καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς εὖ πράττουσι κατ’ 
ἀξίαν· ἄμφω γὰρ δίκαια, καὶ ποιεῖ χαίρειν τὸν ἐπιεικῆ.  
 
Parricides and assassins are those who have acted badly, and so we should feel pleasure at 
their being the objects of vengeance, since they deserve it in virtue of their past bad acts. And 
at least within this context, we can assume that those who are deservedly fortunate are those 
who are so in virtue of past good acts.  
Aristotle’s belief that the quality of our past actions makes it so that we are deserving of 
certain fortunes and undeserving of others is hard to square with the deflationary 
interpretation. The burden is on Roberts to say why we shouldn’t take Aristotle’s appeal to 
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50
 Rhet. 2.9 1386b4. 
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moral desert in the straightforward way suggested by his texts. Indeed, Aristotle’s mention of 
τιμωρία (vengeance) suggests that he isn’t here invoking any form of consequentialist desert, 
according to which one is deserving of some fortune just in case its receipt serves prospective 
concerns. Instead, all evidence suggests that Aristotle’s conception of moral desert is 
retrospective, where one is morally deserving of something in virtue of the moral quality of her 
past actions. And it’s because Aristotle thinks that people are morally deserving of certain 
fortunes that indignation is praiseworthy: it inclines us toward just action, that is, toward 
treating others in accordance with their desert.  
Anger (ὀργή), like indignation, is an emotion and so not a virtue, though it too can be 
praiseworthy. Aristotle defines anger as a desire for vengeance against a particular person, 
because this person has acted unjustly—“for anger is not toward the just”51 (οὐ γίγνεται γὰρ ἡ 
ὀργὴ πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον)—toward oneself or a friend.52 The aim of anger, then, is the pain of the 
person who has acted unjustly,53 which is why it’s often (though perhaps not always) mitigated 
or extinguished when its target falls on greater misfortune than what would have been inflicted 
by oneself.54 While Aristotle generally recommends mildness (presumably because people tend 
more often than not to fail in the direction of the other side of the mean, toward irascibility), he 
still thinks that one can be deficient in anger,55 and that there are instances in which anger is 
appropriate and its absence inappropriate.56  
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Although some morally responsibility skeptics have made space in their theories for 
emotions like anger and indignation by appeal to the overall positive effects of these emotions, 
Aristotle seems not only to be uninterested in doing this (e.g., the aim of anger, he tell us, just is 
the pain of the offender), but also to get into trouble if he were to be doing this. On Aristotle’s 
view, these emotions are constituted in part by certain beliefs about their target, including the 
belief in his truly deserving vengeance or a bad lot. If Aristotle were to reject moral 
responsibility while at the same time insisting that these emotions, themselves constituted by a 
belief in moral responsibility, ought to be kept around, then he would be opening up room for a 
kind of psychic split in the agent, and with it the need to quarantine one belief set off from the 
other. In itself a problematic position, it should not be attributed to Aristotle without some 
indication that he himself endorses it. And there is no such indication.  
Finally, consider what Aristotle says about vengeance (τιμωρία). In Rhet. 1.9, he encourages 
it, claiming that  
Also taking vengeance on enemies is better than reconciling; for retaliating is just, and 
the just thing is fine, and a courageous man should not allow himself to be beaten.57 
 
καὶ τὸ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς τιμωρεῖσθαι μᾶλλον καὶ μὴ καταλλάττεσθαι. τό τε γὰρ 
ἀνταποδιδόναι δίκαιον, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον καλόν, καὶ ἀνδρείου τὸ μὴ ἠττᾶσθαι.  
 
In EN 3.5, Aristotle appeals to the practice of people’s taking vengeance (τιμωροῦνται) against 
wrongdoers as evidence for his claims about voluntariness.58 Not only that, he tells us that “just 
acts of vengeance and punishment are from virtue, and are necessary”59 (αἱ δίκαιαι τιμωρίαι 
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καὶ κολάσεις ἀπ’ ἀρετῆς μέν εἰσιν, ἀναγκαῖαι δέ) (i.e., in the city’s governance). Although here 
one might read Aristotle as providing a consequentialist justification for just vengeance, doing 
so would be a mistake, since just vengeance is a means that is partly constitutive of the city’s 
aim, namely the happiness of its citizens. As such, just vengeance is desirable for its own sake, 
as are the virtues and virtuous action more generally. To say that just vengeance is a 
constitutive means is to say that its value cannot be understood on consequentialist grounds, 
since the act itself is valuable, as a constituent of happiness. 
Aristotle’s views about moral desert and his approbatory claims about indignation, anger, 
and vengeance cannot be accommodated outside of a robust conception of moral 
responsibility, so that these considerations alone speak decisively against the deflationary 
interpretation. But next recall Roberts’ second reason: there’s nothing to sufficiently distinguish 
adults from children, since the majority of adult human beings are (and act) very much like 
children. This belief is reconcilable with the equally plausible view that adults are still morally 
responsible for their actions. For from the fact that a great many adults fail to deploy their 
rational capacities as they should, we cannot conclude that they lack the relevant ability to do 
so. Children and animals, on the other hand, lack this ability, for they lack rational capacities or 
have them only to a limited degree.  
Finally, consider the third point Roberts makes in defense of her deflationary interpretation; 
namely, that for Aristotle human beings are determined to act and to have the character that 
they have by their childhood upbringing. Roberts might simply deny that adults who fail to 
deploy their rational capacities had the ability to do so, reasoning that because they weren’t 
properly habituated to do so, they lacked the ability to do so. Without now saying whether 
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Roberts is correct to construe moral upbringing in this way,60 my response should be obvious 
from preceding considerations. Put simply, the problem with Roberts’ response is that it begs 
the question of the compatibility of moral responsibility with determinism and picks out as the 
relevant ability the strong ability. But as we’ve already seen, there’s no reason to think that this 
is the relevant ability according to Aristotle. And if there’s no reason to think that this is the 
relevant ability, then it cannot be used in defense of the deflationary interpretation as a 
reading of Aristotle.  
So much for the deflationary interpretation.  
5     Aristotle’s Compatibilism 
Above, I defined compatibilism as the view that there’s one possible world at which causal 
determinism is true and there is at least one person who’s morally responsible for something. 
What I’ve shown up to this point is that Aristotle thinks that we’re generally morally responsible 
for what we do, and that determinism isn’t a threat to our being so. Though in showing these 
things, I’ve provided sufficient evidence that Aristotle’s view of moral responsibility is 
compatibilist, I’ve said little about the specifics of his view. I do that now, along the way 
defending Aristotle’s view against one objection.  
5.1     Voluntary action 
At the outset of EN 3.1, Aristotle says the following about his purposes in articulating the 
conditions of voluntariness:  
And because virtue is concerned with passions and actions, and because praise and 
blame are bestowed on voluntary actions, and because forgiveness, and sometimes 
even pity, is on involuntary ones, perhaps it is necessary for those who are studying 
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virtue to delimit the voluntary and the involuntary, and also useful for those who make 
laws toward the distribution of honors and punishments.61 
 
Τῆς ἀρετῆς δὲ περὶ πάθη τε καὶ πράξεις οὔσης, καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς ἑκουσίοις ἐπαίνων καὶ 
ψόγων γινομένων, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς ἀκουσίοις συγγνώμης, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ἐλέου, τὸ ἑκούσιον 
καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον ἀναγκαῖον ἴσως διορίσαι τοῖς περὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπισκοποῦσι· χρήσιμον δὲ 
καὶ τοῖς νομοθετοῦσι πρός τε τὰς τιμὰς καὶ τὰς κολάσεις. 
 
Having shown that Aristotle accepts moral responsibility, we must rethink Roberts’ 
characterization of voluntariness, preserving its prima facie significance when Aristotle links it 
together with praise and blame in this passage. Specifically, voluntariness should be understood 
as a necessary condition for moral responsibility for action, where  
Voluntary Action Condition (VA): φ-ing is voluntary for agent A just in case it is caused 
by some feature of A’s agency (e.g., appetitive desire, choice, deliberation, etc.), and A is 
herself knowledgeable of the particulars of the situation in which she acts.  
 
Interestingly, Aristotle also indicates that he’s interested in introducing gradations of 
voluntariness into his account of voluntary action which aren’t presently reflected in VA. He 
seems to take actions that are caused by certain agential features, in particular deliberation and 
choice (discussed below), to be more voluntary than those that are caused in other ways, for 
example, as a result of mere non-rational desire.  
One interesting feature of Aristotle’s conception of voluntariness is that it allows for moral 
responsibility for action performed under coercive circumstances. Here, it’s important to draw 
attention to the distinction Aristotle draws between (i) a merely coercive circumstance, on the 
one hand, and (ii) a circumstance “which overstrains human nature and nobody would 
withstand” (ἂ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν ὑπερτείνει καὶ μηδεὶς ἂν ὑπομείναι), on the other.62 
Whereas acting under coercion often gives rise to duress, duress alone on Aristotle’s view isn’t 
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enough to excuse one from moral responsibility, thus indicating one way in which Aristotle’s 
view is distinct from other accounts of morally responsible action that categorize duress as 
excusing.63 But though how we act under duress can reveal something deeper about us, 
including the durability and reality (or lack thereof) of our virtue, Aristotle is also clear that 
circumstances of type (ii) are excusing: in the event that we act shamefully under such 
circumstances, we should be forgiven, since we did so only involuntarily. One way we might 
distinguish between circumstances of type (i) and those of type (ii) is by appeal to various 
counterfactual scenarios, through which we test whether and the extent to which the agent 
had the “weak” ability to do otherwise. In the event that she didn’t, and her action was 
shameful, she is to be excused from blame and forgiven.64  
5.2     Morally responsible agency 
Of course, because Aristotle also thinks that children and animals act voluntarily, 
voluntariness cannot be sufficient for moral responsibility for action. What’s needed is a way to 
distinguish merely voluntary agents from morally responsible ones. At the outset of EN 3.2, 
Aristotle provides just this; here, he makes a point to distinguish adults from children in terms 
of the former’s possession of choice (προαίρεσις), saying:  
Indeed, choice appears to be voluntary but not the same [as the voluntary]; the 
voluntary extends further. For even children and the other animals partake of voluntary 
action but not of choice, and we say that the things done abruptly are voluntary but not 
according to choice.65  
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ἡ προαίρεσις δὴ ἑκούσιον μὲν φαίνεται, οὐ ταὐτὸν δέ, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ πλέον τὸ ἑκούσιον· τοῦ 
μὲν γὰρ ἑκουσίου καὶ παῖδες καὶ τἆλλα ζῷα κοινωνεῖ, προαιρέσεως δ’ οὔ, καὶ τὰ 
ἐξαίφνης ἑκούσια μὲν λέγομεν, κατὰ προαίρεσιν δ’οὔ.  
 
While I’ve used choice throughout as a translation for προαίρεσις, this does not perfectly 
capture the original Greek. This is because προαίρεσις is also a type of rational desire, and, qua 
desire, has a duration: it begins when deliberation has ended and the agent has settled on a 
single course of action, and in normal circumstances it terminates when the chosen action has 
been executed. Of course, there are exceptions to this, as when the agent is prevented by 
external circumstances from acting in accordance with his choice, re-deliberates and settles on 
another alternative, or suffers from incontinence. Children and animals lack choice because 
they lack full-fledged reason (λόγος), and so cannot engage in the requisite activities of thought 
(διάνοια) and deliberation (βούλευσις), which precede it.66 Though adults often fail to use their 
reason as they ought, being controlled instead by nonrational elements in their psyche, even to 
the point of acting incontinently, nevertheless that they possess choice and the rational 
capacities it requires is sufficient to distinguish them from non-morally responsible agents. 
Possession of these rational capacities is what picks one out as a mature human being,67 making 
one the target of a distinctive kind of evaluation involving consideration of whether and to 
what extent one is performing well qua human being.  
The moral significance of possession of these rational capacities shouldn’t be downplayed 
simply because one often fails to use them properly or at all; at this point two observations 
regarding their moral significance are noteworthy. First, on Aristotle’s view, their possession 
permits a kind of control over one’s actions and character formation one would otherwise lack. 
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They are what allow us to do well qua human beings, and to determine the mean between 
excess and deficiency. Specifically, while Aristotle believes that the end of action (i.e., our 
conception of happiness, be it virtue, pleasure, honor, etc.) is set by habituation, he also thinks 
that through our possession of these rational capacities we’re able to determine the means 
whereby we achieve our end.68 And in this respect, we can either fail or succeed.  
Moreover, when character has yet to be fully formed, whether we fail or succeed in 
achieving our end will impact the kind of person we ultimately become. And it’s for this reason, 
among others, that Roberts’ deterministic picture of moral upbringing is false. For although 
upbringing sets one’s end, one still has to effectively deploy one’s rational capacities in its 
attainment. For example, you might have had the great fortunate of an upbringing in which the 
virtuous life was extolled and set as your end. Yet should you allow yourself to engage in 
processes of thought whereby you rationalize selfish choices (like reading the novel over 
grading exams), ultimately seeing these selfish choices as virtuous, then you’ll become selfish 
regardless of what you think and had set as your end. It’s in this way that our rational capacities 
are involved in our moral responsibility for our character.  
Second, given how Aristotle conceives of these rational capacities, it is clear that on his view 
they make possible a distinctive form of self-expression. Aristotle conceives of happiness as a 
comprehensive end, or an end for the sake of which all things are chosen and done.69 Because 
choice, deliberation, and reason allow one to determine the means whereby one’s end is to be 
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achieved (reason itself allowing one to have a conception of that end), agents who possess 
these rational capacities are capable of acting for the sake of their conception of happiness, 
which can then be expressed in what they choose and do. Without these rational capacities, 
however, children and animals lack a conception of happiness and simply do, and what they do 
cannot be said to express a conception of the good life (since they both lack a conception of the 
good life, and the capacities whereby they’d determine the means to achieve it). 
 Agents who are morally responsible for their voluntary actions and character, then, are 
those who possess, and have the weak ability to exercise, these various rational capacities. But 
at this point we might wonder whether Aristotle includes an additional constraint on moral 
responsibility for character. On an alternative compatibilist proposal defended by Meyer, 
Aristotle’s argument in EN 3.5 is limited in its scope to those who have a correct view about 
what’s good, and therefore to those who’ve had the benefit of a decent moral education.70 
Meyer provides two reasons: (i) this more narrow group is Aristotle’s target audience, to whom 
he calls attention in various places throughout the beginning stages of EN; and (ii) Aristotle 
thinks that, without a decent moral education, knowledge of what’s good is impossible and yet 
his argument in EN 3.5 hinges on one’s possession of moral knowledge. For Aristotle here 
writes: “and if somebody knowingly performs actions from which he will become unjust, he will 
be unjust voluntarily”71 (εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀγνοῶν τις πράττει ἐξ ὧν ἔσται ἄδικος, ἑκὼν ἄδικος ἂν εἴη).  
Pace Meyer, these reasons are unpersuasive. First, the mere fact that Aristotle’s target 
audience is of a certain sort doesn’t mean that such a group is also the target of his argument 
for responsibility for character. Second, Aristotle’s reference to knowledge in this context is 
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likely not a reference to moral knowledge, but rather to knowledge of the particulars of the 
situation at hand, which is discussed at length in EN 3.1. Without evidence to the contrary, we 
must conclude that Aristotle doesn’t intend moral education to be an additional constraint on 
responsibility for character. Although one might fault Aristotle for his omission here, doing so 
would be premised on a concern that Aristotle’s view of our responsibility practices already 
accommodates; namely, that to subject a person lacking in such an education to retributive 
practices would be unfair, since her moral development was so severely stunted by her 
deprived childhood. While Aristotle is himself silent on this particular matter, he does 
acknowledge that there are propriety considerations that can count against holding another 
person morally responsible for something for which she is in fact morally responsible.72 Thus, 
while still taking such a person to be morally responsible for her character, and so in principle 
an appropriate target for certain responses, it’s open to him to appeal to considerations of 
fairness in order to say why we shouldn’t in fact hold her responsible. In this way, Aristotle’s 
view has the advantage of maintaining the distinction between being responsible and being 
held responsible, a distinction that this appeal-to-fairness objection risks conflating.  
5.3     Objection and response 
But perhaps there are other philosophical reasons that should at the very least make us 
wary of accepting the sort of compatibilist view I’m attributing to Aristotle. I’ll briefly raise and 
respond to one such concern, forwarded by Harry Frankfurt in his influential “Freedom of the 
Will and the Concept of the Person.” Frankfurt’s specific concern is with Aristotle’s account of 
voluntariness, since he thinks that it overlooks the phenomenon of internal compulsion, which 
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happens when one is moved by a desire one would wholeheartedly or all-things-considered 
prefer not to be moved by. An unwilling addict is moved to take a drug while wholeheartedly 
desiring not to do so, and in the end takes the drug.73 Concerns about internal compulsion have 
led responsibility theorists like Frankfurt, Gary Watson, and others to develop so-called “real 
self views,” according to which the ability to act on the basis of some set of psychic elements 
(e.g., wholeheartedly endorsed first-order desires or evaluative judgments) picked out as 
bearing a special relation to one’s “point of view” or real self is both necessary and sufficient for 
moral responsibility. The implication of Frankfurt’s criticism, then, seems to be that internal 
compulsion is a significant threat to voluntariness that Aristotle’s account leaves untouched.74  
My response to Frankfurt’s criticism comes in three parts. First, it’s worth beginning with 
the observation that Aristotle is able to exempt from responsibility those agents who suffer 
from certain psychological disorders that deprive them of or impair their rational capacities. We 
might take some addicts, unwilling or otherwise, to be counted among such agents. Second, 
given that Aristotle’s account of voluntariness permits of gradations within the category of 
voluntary action, where actions in accordance with choice (προαίρεσις) are more voluntary 
than those that aren’t, he can say that internally compelled agents are less (albeit still) 
responsible for what they do when compared with agents who aren’t. For example, imagine 
that in reading the novel over grading exams you were actually acting incontinently, since your 
choice was to grade exams. On Aristotle’s view, while you’re morally responsible for reading 
the novel and thus blameworthy for doing so (since we’ve said that your doing so was actually 
selfish), nevertheless you’re less morally responsible and thus less blameworthy than you would 
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have been if your choice had been to read the novel and you acted on this choice. Finally, we 
should question the significance real self views attach to the ability to act in accordance with 
one’s real self, where this is taken to be sufficient for moral responsibility, even for agents with 
compromised rational capacities. We can imagine a case of a person suffering from a 
psychological disorder that impairs these capacities without also depriving her of the ability to 
act in accordance with her wholehearted desires or evaluative judgments. But while real self 
views cannot say why this person is less or not at all morally responsible for what she does, 
Aristotle can, since his view makes moral responsibility status depend precisely on possession 
of such rational capacities.  
6     Conclusion 
This paper rose out of my dual interests in Aristotle and moral responsibility. At the very 
least, I aimed to show that Aristotle has a compatibilist theory of moral responsibility for action 
and character. Thus, the burden was on me to show that, first, contra the libertarian 
interpreter, none of the claims Aristotle makes about voluntariness assume or implicate an 
indeterminist metaphysics, and that, second, contra the deflationary interpreter, we should 
read Aristotle’s inquiry into the conditions of voluntariness at face-value, as an inquiry into 
conditions for moral responsibility.  
I began by responding to three arguments in favor of the libertarian interpretation. In 
response to the first, premised on Aristotle’s claim that we are the sole source of our voluntary 
actions, I argued that Aristotle should be best read as making a more metaphysically modest 
source claim, which amounts to the claim that various features of our agency function as the 
best explanation for our actions. This is clear from Aristotle’s argument for the conclusion that 
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mixed actions and actions done for the sake of noble or pleasant objects originate in us. In 
response to the second, premised on Aristotle’s attribution of the ability to do otherwise to 
voluntary agents, I argued against a strong ability attribution, in support of a weak one. I did 
this by showing Aristotle’s commitment to the Sufficiency for Action Thesis, according to which 
various agential features, together with background conditions, are sufficient for an agent’s 
acting in a particular way. Finally, the third libertarian argument is premised on Aristotle’s 
claims about the amount of control we have over our not-yet-fully-acquired character, on the 
one hand, and our fully-acquired character on the other. Whereas he takes us to have control 
over the former, since alternatives are available, the lack of alternatives with the latter leads 
him to conclude that we’re not in control of our character once it’s fully acquired. While one 
explanation for this discrepancy is that Aristotle thinks that antecedent causes sufficient for a 
particular outcome undermine alternatives, I argued that even a compatibilist could be 
committed to these seemingly discrepant control claims.  
Next, I took up the deflationary interpretation, arguing that it can’t be sustained in light of 
Aristotle’s conception of moral desert (one’s being worthy of, τὸ ἄξιος εἷναι, something in 
virtue of past actions) and the place of indignation (νέμεσις), anger (ὀργή), and vengeance 
(τιμωρία) in the overall good life and city. Aristotle’s characterization of these things – his 
conception of anger, for example, having its end in the infliction of pain on its target – suggests 
his acceptance of desert-based responsibility. And while some of Aristotle’s suggestions about 
the excellence of anger, indignation, and just vengeance might be read along consequentialist 
lines, I blocked this by arguing that these emotions and actions are, on Aristotle’s view, not only 
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means to happiness but constituents thereof, and that, as constituents of happiness, they are 
desirable for their own sake and not on strictly forward-looking grounds.   
I concluded by detailing the compatibilist view that emerges from these considerations. 
Specifically, I argued that voluntariness for Aristotle is a necessary but not sufficient condition 
for moral responsibility for action. In addition to performing the action voluntarily, to be 
morally responsible for it, one also has to be a morally responsible agent, which one is, on 
Aristotle’s view, if one possesses choice and the various rational capacities its possession 
requires.  
As with most any project, acceptance of some incompleteness seems also to be a condition 
for the project’s being completed. I close by pointing out three things this paper leaves 
underdeveloped or untouched altogether. First, more could be said about the sorts of agential 
features Aristotle takes to be at the heart of voluntary action, and which of these he prioritizes 
and why. In my paper, I pick out choice and the various rational capacities its possession 
requires, since Aristotle himself seems to do this. But more should be said about why he does 
this. Another question in need of further consideration is to what extent Aristotle’s argument 
for the voluntariness of character in EN 3.5 is meant also to supply a sufficient condition for the 
voluntariness of action; while it’s clear that in this passage Aristotle wants to establish the 
voluntariness of certain states, like drunkenness and ignorance, by appeal to our control or past 
control over their cause, action seems not to be directly within the scope of his interest here. 
Finally, while in this paper I argued that Aristotle should be interpreted as attributing to 
voluntary agents a weak ability to do otherwise, the possession of which is to be determined by 
consideration of relevant counterfactuals that satisfy our metric of closeness to the actual 
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world, I did not go into much detail about what kinds of counterfactuals would or would not 
satisfy such a metric. I think that consideration of Aristotle’s discussion of abilities in Meta. 5.12 
and 9.5 would put me in a better position to do this. In fact, I actually think that this discussion 
would support a more straightforward approach to resolving the question of the compatibility 
of the ability to do otherwise and determinism, on Aristotle’s view. 
.     
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